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Europeanisation and Social Movements: The Case of the Stop TTIP Campaign 
Manuela Caiani & Paolo Graziano 
 
“(…) We want to prevent employment, social, environmental, privacy and consumer standards from 
being lowered and public services (such as water) and cultural assets from being deregulated in 
non-transparent negotiations. The ECI supports an alternative trade and investment policy in the 
EU”. 
(lawsuit of the Stop TTIP coalition, https://stop-ttip.org/lawsuit-ecj/) 
Introduction  
Since 2013, the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership) agreement has been one of the 
most controversial policies discussed at the EU level (Morin et al. 2015). Formally, the negotiations- 
aimed at facilitating trade between the US and the EU started in July 2013 after a two-year period 
when a “the EU Trade Commissioner and the US Trade Representative looked into the various 
initiatives that could benefit job creation, economic growth, international competitiveness and the 
development of high international standards in various areas” (European Commission 2016: 1). Since 
2014, the Stop TTIP coalition – a movement of more than 500 European organisations– has become 
increasingly vocal and has organised a petition aimed at blocking the negotiations conducted by the 
European Commission and the EU member states via the European Council. Over 3, 2 million 
signatures have been collected for a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI)i. Although the petition was 
rejected by the Commission (in Sept. 2014) as falling outside the scope of the ECI Regulation, the 
Stop TTIP coalition continued to collect signatures and initiated a lawsuit submitted to the European 
Court of Justice. The TTIP agreement is considered by the Stop TTIP coalition to “pose a threat to 
democracy, the rule of law, the environment, health, public services as well as consumer and labour 
rights” (https://stop-ttip.org/). Furthermore, between 2014-2016, together with the Stop TTIP 
coalition several other organisations have mobilised against the TTIP conducting a number of 
initiatives both at the national and EU level in order to influence European institutions (e.g. the EP). 
For example, in May 2016 Greenpeace Netherlands unveiled a number of documents connected to 
TTIP (www.ttip-leaks.org), generating a strong reaction also on the side of EU governments. 
Currently, the TTIP has come to a dead end (the ECJ ruling was issued on May 2017, with a verdict 
favourable to the protesters), mostly due to the multilevel campaign orchestered by the Stop TTIP 
campaing, as we shall illustrate in this contribution.   
We consider TTIP as a very promising case study to analyse social movements’ Europeanisation - 
that is, their capacity to mobilise referring to European issues, targets, and identities. From a research 
standpoint, although since the mid of 1990s valuable contributions on the Europeanisation of social 
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movements have already been produced (e.g. among others della Porta & Caiani 2009; Imig & Tarrow 
2000; Marks and McAdam 1996; Koopmans & Statham 2010; Rucht 2002; Tarrow 1994), finding 
moderate numbers of europeanised protests and actors, however, they are quite outdated. More recent 
works – on global waves of contention (e.g. della Porta & Mattoni 2014; Kousis 2014) - tend to 
overlook specific processes of Europeanisation. Recent studies have been limited to austerity 
measures (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015), whereas the TTIP has been studied more from a trade 
unions’ (Dierckx 2015; Leiren & Parks 2014) or an international relations perspective (Morin et al. 
2015). However, over the past few years, the economic crisis has presumably increased the 
significance of the EU as one of the ‘key crisis actors’ for contention (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 
35). The TTIP, similarly to other recent European civil society campaings such as ACTA and 
Bolkestein (della Porta & Parks 2015, 2016), allows us to provide an additional piece of empirical 
research to the question of the participation of citizens in European politics.  
In this article we test the Europeanisation hypothesis according to which, due to increasing 
competencies at EU level, there should be an ‘upscaling’ of protest and that the EU should become a 
central target of collective action, as well as a significant level for mobilisation and focus for the 
creation of actors’ identities. TTIP seems to be a crucial test case since it concerns a policy area 
(foreign trade) which falls under the exclusive competence of the EU, and where – however – political 
opportunities for civil society actors are ‘closed’ (negotiations kept ‘secret’, discussed mainly within 
the European Council, and on a very technical issue, difficult to mobilise a large public, etc.; see 
Dierckx 2015). So why and how has this movement ‘Europeanised’?  
Our analysis builds on an original comparative dataset that includes supranational actors (i.e. anti 
TTIP organisations at the EU level) and national actors from six EU countries (Austria, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Great Britain and France). We use various sources to investigate the degree and forms 
of social movements’ Europeanisation (section 3). A protest event analysis and semi-structured 
interviews in Brussels with key representatives of the movements and policy makers have allowed us 
to observe the evolution of various indicators of the Europeanisation of social movement 
organisations against TTIP, linking them to opportunities (sec. 4) and resources (sec. 5). This, as 
stated in the conclusion (sec. 6) will not only disconfirm the traditional low representation of these 
types of actors in the current European politics, but will indicate instead strong signs of 
(differentiated) paths of Europeanisation from below. Not only the paths of Europeanisation vary 
from country to country, but they are also influenced by the interplay between the political 
opportunities at the EU and the domestic level. 
  
Europeanisation and Social Movements: The Analytical Framework 
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In this study we investigate the degree and forms of social movements Europeanisation. We argue 
that Europeanisation occurs when movements i. develop European organisations and/or transnational 
contacts with groups in other countries (i.e. ‘European actors’); ii. contest authorities beyond the state 
(i.e. ‘European targets’); iii. mobilise around European issues and/or organise their protest with a 
European ‘scope’ (namely they give birth to ‘European events’, staged in Bruxelles or in more 
European countries simultaneously) (see also Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015). We adopt the concept 
of Europeanisation to refer not only to ‘the emergence and development at the European level of 
distinct structures of governance’ (Risse et al. 2001: 3), but also to the impacts of these structures at 
the domestic level in influencing the ways in which collective actors make their demands visible in 
the public spheres. With this regard, we address the ‘processual’ aspects of Europeanisation by 
analysing the reciprocal influences between European and national structures to indicate a research 
design that develops from “an analysis of the system of interactions (actors, resources, problems, etc.) 
at the domestic level”, and raises the question of “whether the EU affects this system of interaction 
and if so in what way” (Radaelli & Franchino 2004: 948; Saurugger 2006). We therefore study 
whether “Europanisation from below” (e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009) is taking place in response to 
top-down Europeanisation, as in the case of the TTIP.  
Starting from the above cited scholarship (helpfully distinguishing between ‘non-Europeanised’ 
grass-roots collective action, which does not address EU issues at all, and various forms of 
Europeanised social movement actions), in this study in order to empirically investigate the degree 
of (anti TTIP) movements Europeanisation, we will look at ‘how much’ the following dimensions of 
SMOs’ collective action (actors, target, level of mobilisation), vary in terms of ‘scope’ (national vs. 
European)ii.  
However, as it has been suggested (Ladrech 1994), while the reorientation of domestic organisational 
logics is a feature of Europeanisation, the homogenisation or harmonisation of domestic practices 
across Europe is not a realistic expectation. Instead, pre-existing domestic structures and internal 
developments are likely to have an important mediating effect. With this regard, in our study we also 
look at the ways through which this is done, notably by lookingiii at the forms of Europeanisation and 
their repertoire of action (i.e. consensual vs. conflictual). More specifically, if Europeanisation 
produces multi-level governance (Marks et al. 1996: 2014), then collective actions should adapt to 
intervening in and influencing the multiple territorial layers of decision-making (Mazey & 
Richardson 2002; Tilly 1978), by adapting their strategies in order not only to communicate with the 
various territorial levels of government but also to develop strategies of ‘crossed influence’. A 
typology of the different forms of Europeanisation of social movements mobilisation (Balme & 
Chabanet 2002; della Porta & Caiani 2009; Imig & Tarrow 2000, 2001) can be built by combining 
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the territorial scope of the protester with the target. In a fully supranational polity, all important 
claims should be made by European political parties, interest groups, social movements and other 
collective actors targeting the European institutions (‘supranationalisation’). National mobilisations 
may, however, Europeanise as well. This could, for instance, occur when European actors exercise 
transnational pressure by intervening in national context, criticising national policies or propagating 
European integration. A third path to the Europeanisation of the collective action is domestication, 
where the EU or its policies are either the source or the indirect target of the protest by domestic 
actors but the direct target remains the nation state. Domestication can be considered as proof of the 
dominant position of the nation state, but also as a stimulus for innovations in the organisational 
structure and the frames of the protests. Finally, a form of externalisation is present if and when the 
mobilisations of national actors target the EU directly. We will analyse ‘how’ Europeanisation of 
social movements develop using this typology. 
Turning to the explanatory level, to analyse the degree and forms of Europeanisation of social 
movement organisations and NGOs against the TTIP, we refer to classical categories of social 
movement studies (e.g. Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1998). European integration has raised concerns about 
its effect on the distribution of power among different actors, and in particular the role of the civil 
society. Some scholars are optimist, stressing the capacity of the traditional actors of democracies 
such as political parties, interest groups, etc., to adapt to the EU, organising at this level and taking 
advantage of it. On the other hand, scholars looking in particular at social movements and protest, 
have been more skeptical that actors equipped with scarce material resources (finance, 
professionalisation, etc.) may be able to build transnational organisations or stage mobilisations at 
the EU level, stressing that protest directly targeting the EU is scant (Giugni & Passy 2002; Imig 
2004; Rucht 2002). Similar results also emerged from studies focusing on the European claim-making 
of civil society (Koopmans & Statham 2010). Moreover, works analysing more in depth the activities 
of social movement organisations around European institutions have emphasised that the structure of 
the EU interest groups is dominated by business organisations (Beyers 2002; Greenwood 2007; 
Saurugger 2006). Also, more recent analyses on the anti-austerity waves of protest in Europe have 
stressed the lack of transnational coordination, as well as the difficulty by the challengers in framing 
the mobilisation in European terms (e.g. Mathers 2016). Nevertheless, it has been observed that the 
degree of involvement of social movements in European politics varies by different dimensions of 
Europeanisation and by country (della Porta & Caiani 2009; for the cognitive dimension of social 
movements’ Europeanisation and the role played in it by the mobilisation of expertise by strategic 
actors at the EU level, see Geddes & Guiraudon 2004; Monforte 2014); it has been particularly strong 
during European Council summits; and that they are willing to cooperate with, not dismantle, EU 
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institutions (della Porta & Parks 2015). Finally, it has been noted that above all organisations that 
adapt to the rules of the game toward the European institutions (namely to a consensual style, not 
protest) obtain some routine access to supranational organisations (see Rootes 2002). 
Against this background, this article investigates more specific hypotheses regarding the interaction 
between the EU and social movements. Research on social movements, first of all, has related 
strategic choices to the available political opportunities (i.e. POS), namely the set of opportunities 
and constraints that are offered by the institutional structure of the political systems in which these 
groups operate (Kriesi 2004; Tarrow 1994). The concept refers to the degree of ‘closure/openness’ of 
a political system to the claims raised by the protesters (either in terms of long-lasting institutional 
features of a regime e.g. electoral system, degree of centralisation, and in terms of more ‘dynamics’ 
political opportunities, as the configuration of power between allies and opponents, etc.). To a certain 
extent, movement organisations adapt to the public decision-making structure, mobilising when and 
where access channels open up (Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978). While ‘open’ opportunities encourage 
mobilisation, the lack (or the closing) of these opportunities often translates in scarce mobilisation or 
even the escalation of more disruptive actions (i.e. ‘curvilinear relation’). Beyond political 
opportunities, some scholars suggest to integrate the notion of ‘cultural and discursive opportunities’ 
(i.e. COS and DOS) which determine, in a country, what kind of ideas become visible for the public, 
resonate with public opinion and are held to be “legitimate” by the audience’ (Kriesi 2004: 72). In 
this respect, the opportunities for movements mobilisation can be characterised also in terms of more 
inclusive or exclusive cultural and discursive contexts vis-à-vis the challengers (e.g. the political 
culture and discourses on a specific topic of the elites, the way authorities manage collective action, 
etc.) iv. 
From this perspective, and referring to mobilisation against the TTIP, we can observe that the political 
and cultural/discursive opportunities available for the challengers are not so favourable (i.e. ‘open’) 
at the EU level (see table A in Appendix) and this may have a negative impact on their degree of 
Europeanisation (Hyp. 1). In addition, focusing on action strategies (i.e. forms of Europeanisation), 
it has been observed that the policy style influences collective action form: European governance is 
more open to conventional lobbying than to contentious actions (Marks & McAdam 1999: 103-104; 
see also Tilly 1978; Saurugger 2006). With this regard, at the EU level we expect to find a more 
frequent use of insider strategies by (anti TTIP) social movements, conforming to the institutional 
preferences for dealing with ‘polite’ lobbyists rather than protest (Hyp. 2)v. At the same time closed 
POS might lead to a radicalisation of protest. 
Strategic choices, however, must also take into account the available resources (McCarthy & Zald 
1996). The capacity to organise at the European level is linked to the characteristics of specific actors 
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and their capacity to mobilise material and symbolic resources (della Porta and Caiani 2009). The 
availability of material resources (e.g. size, degree of professionalisation, etc.) has been cited to 
explain the larger capacity of business interest groups to intervene at the EU level, whereas their 
absence has been considered as responsible for the weakness of public interest groups and social 
movements (such as environmentalists, etc.) in European politics (Balme & Chabanet 2002; Giugni 
& Passy 2002; Rootes 2002). If this holds true, we should expect (Hyp. 3) that those actors more 
equipped with organisational resources, as well as lobby-oriented (for example interest groups) will 
‘Europeanise’ more (i.e. in terms of development of European organisations, target and actions) than 
informal, fragmented, and protest-oriented movement organisations. In this line, and according to 
what suggested by recent research on the Europeanisation of SMOs (e.g. see Geddes & Guiraudon 
2004; Lahusen 2004; Monforte 2014), we could also assume to find differences in the (levels of) 
Europeanisation of different types of SMOs. 
Beyond the above mentioned hypotheses, other considerations however would lead us to expect a 
more significant degree of Europeanisation of movements and contention. First, since the political 
opportunity approach stresses the need for social movements to address the territorial levels where 
decisions are taken (Tarrow 1989), we should expect attempts to develop multilevel strategies in order 
to reduce the costs of European protest campaigns (della Porta & Tarrow 2005). Referring to the 
concept of ‘multilevel opportunity structures’, which underlines the effectiveness for social 
movements of exploiting political opportunities at multiple territorial levels (della Porta, Kriesi & 
Rucht 2009, della Porta & Parks 2016; Parks 2015), we argue that although the EU political 
opportunities does not appear favourable for the TTIP challengers (see Tab. A in Appendix), we have 
to specify our hypotheses crossnationally. In particular, following the POS approach, and combining 
the context opportunities concerning the TTIP, at both the national and European level, we 
hypothesise that social movements would be more motivated to address the European level when they 
have less leverage at home (Hyp.1b), in an attempt to trigger “boomerang” effects (Keck & Sikkink 
1998). For example, concerning environmental non-governmental organisations in the UK, FR and 
DE, on the basis of a content analysis of news wires, Poloni-Staudinger (2008) stress that changes in 
domestic elite alliances and electoral cleavages help to explain why groups choose to target activity 
at the supranational level. When the domestic opportunity structure is closed, supranational activity 
becomes more likely (and, to the contrary, the opening of the domestic political opportunity structure 
decreases supranational activity among groups). More specifically, in our work, we can expect that 
in countries where the political and discursive opportunities for the challengers of the TTIP (for more 
details on our operationalisation of POS/DOS, see Table A in appendix) are unfavourable (i.e. 
‘closed’), social movements would be more Europe-oriented, either in terms of degree (i.e. EU as 
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actor, level of mobilisation and target) and paths of Europeanisation (i.e. developing an 
externalisation of protest). Viceversa, in countries where they deal with a more ‘open’ context of 
opportunities (i.e. POS/DOS), they may tend to be more focussed domestically for their mobilisation 
(either in terms of degree and paths of Europeanisation, i.e. developing a domestication of European 
protest, targeting domestic institution and organising at the national level). As for the ‘discursive 
opportunities’ it has been demonstrated for instance that the discourse of national political elites 
exerts a strong influence on the mobilisation of collective actors, opening up or vice versa posing 
constraints to them (Koopmans & Statham 2010).  
Second, as social movement scholars have observed (Tilly 1978), opportunities vary across time, 
therefore, opening up or closing during one campaing. Likewise, we hypothesise (Hyp. 1c) a 
growth/decrease of Europeanisation of (anti TTIP) social movements (in terms of target, actors and 
events) over time as the European institutional opportunities, common to our six countries, open or 
close over time. Finally, beyond material resources, cognitive resources (Geddes and Guiraudon 
2004) and cultural traditions also play an important role in facilitating or hampering the development 
of transnational strategies. For instance, policy analysis studies underline that expertise is a decisive 
factor that favours the presence of civil society in the EU policy-making (Rodekamp 2013), and 
movement scholars have showed that social movements as “newer, resource-poor organisations that 
tend to reject conventional politics” easily develop transnational identities and actions (della Porta & 
Mosca 2009: 783). From this point of view, SMOs could be expected (Hyp.3b) to be more motivated 
to develop supranational networks, identities, and actions than, for instance, political parties or trade 
unions, which are traditionally more deeply rooted in the nation states (Marks & McAdam 1996; 
Larsson 2014). To be sure, also recent studies focusing on interest groups and the European system 
of governance (Beyers & Kerremans 2011) have found that the groups’ material resources explain at 
a lesser extent their access to the EU than their relations with domestic parties and overall domestic 
embeddedness. Also in our study we will pay a particular attention to the relational resources of the 
anti TTIP movement. 
 
Methods and data 
Two primary methods have been used for the empirical analysis. To measure the degree and paths 
(i.e. forms) of Europeanisation of the Stop-TTIP organisations, we have conducted a protest event 
analysis (PEA), between 2014 (when the issue became fully visible on the EU policy agenda) and 
May 2016 in six European countries and at the EU level for a total of 784 events coded. Following a 
long-standing tradition in social movements research (Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978), and despite its 
limitations (McCarthy & Zald 1996; Mueller 1997), we used PEA since it is a technique of 
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quantitative content analysis that allows the quantification of many protest properties, such as 
frequency, timing and duration, location, claims, etc. (Koopmans & Rucht 2002). In our study, in 
order to retrieve relevant information on the the anti TTIP protest in Europe, we relied on a 
combination of sources: i. national quality newspapers scanned for relevant articles using keywords 
(e.g. ‘TTIP & protest’, ‘TTIP & mobilisation’, etc.) on the Lexis Nexis databasevi; ii. online 
information portals, as for example Euronews and Eurobserver; and iii. the ‘news sections’ of the 
Stop TTIP organisations’ websites in the six countries (namely, specific sections where ‘news’ from 
other newspapers or press agencies are reported) vii. We used a formalised codebook. Our unit of 
analysis (the ‘protest event’) consists of the following elements (variables for the coding): an actor 
who initiates the protest event; the form of action; the target at which the action is directed; an object 
actor whose interests are affected by the event; and finally the substantive content of the event, which 
states what is to be done (issue). In order to measure the level ‘Europeanisation’ of each of these 
dimensions we added the variable ‘scope’, ranging from local, to national, crossnational, and 
European/supranational (for ‘measurement’ details see the endnotes in section 4). Only the categories 
sovranational/EU have been considered measuring ‘Europeanised’ actors, events and targets.  
Cautiously, and with many interpretative caveats, our protest events allow for controlling if not the 
‘real’ amount and forms of the protest, at least the associations between specific characteristics of 
protest repertoires, as well as general trends. Furthermore, triangulation with other sources was used 
to improve our interpretation of the PEA data. Indeed, in a second part of the study, aware of the 
critiques to the ‘structuralist bias’ of the POS approaches (Diani & McAdam 2003), we have 
integrated the PEA with 12 semi-structured interviews with key representatives of movement 
organisations and policy makers (see Table B in Appendix). For the interviewees selection, we 
followed a positional method and the so called ‘snowball’ technique (Denzin & Lincoln 2011). 
Finally, an in-depth analysis of documents (policy reports, statistical databases, Eurobarometer) 
concerning the TTIP agreement and the mobilisation at EU and domestic level allowed us to 
reconstruct its (political and cultural) context. For further details about our methods see Table C in 
appendix. 
As for the country cases selection, the first criterion was to compare those countries represented by 
the highest number of Stop TTIP campaign members (out of the total number of 522 organisations of 
the coalition), in order to have a ‘critical mass’ of protest events to analyse. Secondly, this set of 
countries was chosen because they provide for sufficient variation along the dimensions we 
considered potentially relevant for the European mobilisation (see table A in Appendix). 
 
(Multilevel) Political Opportunities and Europeanisation 
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The mobilisation intensity around European issues 
A first indicator of Europeanisation of social movements is their mobilisation intensity around 
European issues, i.e.: how much do SMOs take part in public debates and actions concerning 
European politics (as the TTIP)? First of all, our protest event data confirm that the Stop- TTIP 
mobilisation is a significant and increasing phenomenon in the period under analysis (Figure 1): 784 
total TTIP-related actions initiated by movements, NGOs, interest groups and various actors have 
been identified (respectively 172 in Germany, 129 in Austria, 122 in Italy, 90 in Spain, 94 in France, 
87 in the UK, and 90 at the European level). Secondly, considerable variations across the six countries 
can be observed, with stable or increasing levels of Stop TTIP mobilisation for the majority of our 
countries.   
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Out of the 784 total protest events, 228 have been organised in 2014, 467 in 2015 and 89 within the 
first 4 months of 2016 (for an hyphotetical total, according to a linear projection, of 270 events in 
2016). The events conducted at the EU level have been: 32 in 2014 (14% of the annual total), 48 in 
2015 (10%) and 10 in 2016 (11%) for a total of 83 events (11% of the codified cases). Overall, for 
all the countries, the peak of mobilisation on the TTIP has occurred between the second semester of 
2014 and first of 2015, with some very small variations. More specifically, in Spain (but the same 
holds true for the EU level) the intensity of mobilisation remained stable over time, France is the only 
country where it decreases, in Germany, already very high at the beginning of our analysis the 
intensity of mobilisation against the TTIP sharply increased from 2014 to 2016, as well as in AT, UK 
and IT, although not linearlyviii. Besides the number of actions, an additional relevant aspect of the 
intensity of mobilisation is the number of participants. According to our protest event data, the size 
of events organised against the TTIP in the period of our analysis is high: 796.299 participants in the 
first semester of 2014; 1.331.069 in the second; 148.649 in the first six months of 2015 and 3.277.768 
in the second; and 226.940 in the first 4 months of 2016. In all countries, half of the events (50%) 
involve a high number of participants (on median, 300), confirming that this European issue was 
higly ‘partecipated’ by civil society- also involving a wide range of actors (as illustrated in section 
5).   
The data on the intensity of mobilisation may be understood via the POS framework, when looking 
at the changing political opportunities at the EU level. Our findings appear to be in line with the 
apparent opening of the decision-making process, since the protest reached its peak (similarly in most 
of our countries) when it seemed that the European Parliament could have supported the positions of 
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the Stop-TTIP movement. Actually, in April 2014 the EP postponed the vote on the TTIP to July 
2015, creating a ‘momentum’ for social movements’ hopes and mobilisation. This -as it has been 
noticed (see Bouza García & Villar 2012; Greenwood 2012)- set indeed a favourable ‘context’ for 
the protest, opening the (perception of) room for new players in Brussels, although the 2014 ECI was 
immediately rejected by the Commission. When in July 2015 the European Parliament passed a 
resolution substantially in favour of the agreement, the only possible opening of the opportunity 
structure at the EU level was definitively closed. However, after the end of 2015 the mobilisation of 
civil society against the TTIP continued, assuming more expressive (and cognitive) forms rather than 
protest, as exemplified by the words of ‘Friends of the Earth’ representative: “the European 
institutions became even more closed to our requests over time, and the ‘wikileaks’ simply showed 
how we were right in denouncing the lack of transparency which characterised the decision-making 
– although our concerns had not been previously considered. Even the European Parliament, within 
which initially we did have some supporters and potential allies, was not very open to our ideas” (Int. 
9).  
 
European actors, targets and events 
A second step in assessing the degree of Europeanisation of the (anti TTIP) social movements, is to 
examine to what extent the collective actors who protests, their targets, and their events have a 
European scopeix (Figure 2). These indicators allow us to investigate the ‘salience’ of the integration 
process in the everyday life of citizens, i.e. whether the nation state remains the primary focus of their 
political action and identities, or, on the contrary, actors increasingly frame their protest within a 
European dimension.  
 
<Figure 2 here> 
 
When looking at the scope of the protesters against TTIP, in all countries, ‘European’ actors account 
for a moderate proportion of events (4.5% on average – from 3.9% of European claimants in Austria 
to 10% in Spain and in the United Kingdom, with Germany in between with 5.8%), a level that 
however rises to 7% if we add the cross-national actors initiating anti TTIP events, i.e. those 
mobilising simultaneously in two or more European countries). Indeed, overall, national actors are 
still the main initiators of TTIP protests (in, respectively, 72% and 20% of cases). Differently, looking 
at scope of the target of protest, in all countries, although national (and subnational) institutions are 
still important targets (in 37% of cases), the role of European ones is relevant, accounting for more 
than one third of events. In a cross-country perspective, this picture varies from 70% of European 
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targets in the Italian and Spanish anti TTIP protest, to 30% in France, to 15% and 8% in Germany 
and United Kingdom. The high proportion of European level targets of the TTIP mobilisation is 
particularly relevant, especially when compared to previous research (della Porta and Caiani 2007; 
Koopmans and Statham 2010). Finally, another important indicator of the Europeanisation of social 
movements is the level of mobilisation (i.e. scope of the event), which is in principle independent 
from the scope of the subject actor and /or target, referring instead to the the capacity of creating 
‘European’ initiatives. In the protests of the countries under study, about 10% of all events are 
organised at the EU level, against 83% at the domestic level. Once again the European reference 
remains less important in the events organised by the German and British organisations, whereas it is 
more prominent in the Spanish and Italian case, with France in between.  
Also the national differences in the (Europeanisation of) mobilisation against TTIP emerged from our 
data, can be partly explained by the POS at the domestic level. More specifically, the Austrian 
political and discursive opportunities seem to be particularly open for the TTIP challengers both at 
the institutional level (with Left parties and Unions supportive of them) and at non institutional level 
(with 70% of Austrians against the TTIP vs. an EU average of 32%). Furthermore, there is 
transparency and institutional discussions with respect to the TTIP: for example, the Head of the 
Austrian government spoke out against some parts of the agreement (i.e. the ISDS) and there are 
growing concerns across the parties in parliament, with Parliamentary appeals and TTIP presentation 
before the Parliament (22/2/2016). Finally, the protesters seem to have ‘allies’ among economic 
actors, with small and medium enterprises publicly taking position against TTIP (Austrian Stop-TTIP 
campaing representative 15/07/2015).  
Similarly, also in Germany the political opportunities for the Stop TTIP mobilisation appears as very 
open: the movement can rely on ‘allies in power’ (like the Social Democrats), as well on the support 
of the Unions (and other economic categories such as the small businessesx), and of the main 
institutions (Government, Parliament, MEPs, Judiciary)xi. As explained by the representative of one 
German organisation, “the opportunities were fairly open since several political parties’, interest 
groups and trade unions have been particularly receptive to the demands of the movements (Int. 3). 
Furthermore, also the media are increasingly critical against the TTIP and there is a huge and 
increasing societal (awareness and) consensus in the country against the agreement (59% of Germans, 
Eurobarometer 2015).  
To the contrary, in the case of France the political opportunities configuration is not so clear since 
on the one hand – from a non institutional standpoint – the Socialist government has clearly spoken 
against TTIP more recently (3 May 2016), whereas on the other hand the local authorities have been 
supportive of the protest initiatives from the beginning. For example, on the party level, although the 
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French Socialists and several MEPs stand against TTIP, also the right-wing parties tried to capitalise 
on the discontent of the people using the ‘TTIP’ issue. Furthermore, according to the Stop-TTIP 
coordinator the [‘multilevel’] institutional opportunities for the protest have been ambivalent, with 
local authorities more open than the national government to the request of the protesters but clearly 
less powerful in terms of decision-making (Int. 2). At the societal level, in fact, the opportunities for 
the protest against TTIP seem moderately favourable, with only a 34% of French citizens against the 
agreement (Eurobarometer 2015).  
In Italy and Spain, both the political and discoursive opportunities to the anti TTIP protest appear 
more closed, as explained by the Italian representatives of the Stop-TTIP campaign: “the chances of 
being heard by the national institutions have always been very low. The only way to be considered is 
to mobilise widely at the European level” (Int. 5). In Italy, although like in other countries local 
authorities took action against the TTIP (several dozens of municipalities and some important 
Regions), the Government is one of the main supporters of TTIP negotiations in EU, as confirmed by 
several public statements of the Economic Minister (among others, Il Fatto Quotidiano, 30/05/2016). 
Moreover, trade unions have an unclear and divided position on the TTIP and only 26% of Italians 
are against the agreement (Eurobarometer 2015). According to the representatives of the movement 
in the country this is also due “to the ‘silence’ or misleading communication on the issue by the 
media” (Int. 1). Similarly, in Spain, the movement against TTIP had to face ‘closed’ opportunities 
structure, made of the majority of political parties (i.e. PP, PSOE, UPyD y CiU) that have approved 
the treaty (e.g. the vote of the PSOE on it in May 2015) and a scarce information on the topic by 
traditional media. Also the public opinion support of the movement is moderate (with the ECI 
signatures quorum only at 17% in the country), and only 20% of the Spanish against the agreement 
(Eurobarometer 2015). According to the Spanish Stop-TTIP representatives (document 15/07/2015), 
this was also due “to the complicity of mass media that have not provided to citizens an accurate 
information on the topic” (p.13). 
Finally, in the United Kingdom the political and (especially) discursive opportunities are slightly open 
for the movement. This is due to a configuration of power that sees: the independentist parties (e.g. 
the Scottish National party) as well as the national opposition and local authorities mobilising against 
the TTIP, and, more in general, a significant debate around the topic and information kept alive by 
several government committees and reports. Also the societal awareness is high (although 
surprisingly only 23% of population is against the TTIP, Eurobarometer 2015), with artists, celebrities 
and intellectuals taking openly critical positions against the agreement.  
To summarise our assessment of the political and discursive opportunities considered together in the 
six countries (see Table A in Appendix for further operationalisation details): (a) Germany, ‘very 
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open’; (b) Austria, ‘open’; (c) France and United Kingdom, ‘slightly open’’; (d) Italy and Spain, 
‘closed’. 
In line with our research hypotheses concerning the multilevel nature of political opportunties, the 
crossnational analysis reveals that the Europeanisation of social movements is influenced by the 
general political and discursive opportunities in their own country. They tend to ‘Europeanise’ more 
(especially in terms of EU targets and events), where the domestic opportunities are closed, whereas 
in those countries, like Austria, Germany and, partly the UK, where the political and discursive 
opportunities are opener vis-à-vis the challengers, they ‘Europeanise’ to a lesser extent (see for 
confirmation Int. 3). In fact, the most numerous and bigger events are in countries characterised with 
an open opportunity structure (Austria and Germany), whereas in the others – characterised by more 
unfavourable political and discursive opportunities – the protest events are less numerous. The Italian 
exception, as a country where we found high levels of TTIP mobilisation in spite of an unfavourable 
political and societal context, can be explained by the interplay beetween the national and the EU 
context: the following section will address this aspect.  
 
Time: The enduring Europeanisation from below 
Regarding diacronichal trends (figure not showed), our data point to an enduring adaptation among 
non-institutional actors to the shift in competences to the supranational level. The presence of 
European level targets, actors and events of anti the TTIP social movements has indeed been 
increasing, although not in a linear fashion, over the years. In particular, EU targets and EU events 
tend to increase across time. In particular, events with an EU scope double, from 14% in 2014 to 38% 
in 2015 (and 18% in the first 4 months of 2016). Events with EU targets remain stable, from a very 
high 43% at the beginning of 2014 to the 40% in the first 4 months of 2016. Although the mobilisation 
by ‘European’ movements, very high at the beginning of the campaing (28% of cases in the first 
semester of 2014), tends to decrease towards the end of the period analysed, events organised by 
‘crossnational’ movement actors (which can be interpreted as an intermediate category of ‘horizontal’ 
Europeanisation), initially absent, increases reaching 5% in 2016. 
  
Forms of Europeanisation 
This growing ‘Europeanisation from below’ follows however a peculiar pattern. Applying our 
typology of forms of Europeanisation to our data (Table 2)xii, we observe that, overall, the 
Europeanisation of protest mainly assumes the forms of domestication (55.3%)xiii, followed by 
externalisation (27.2%), where national actors exert pressure on European targets to have more 
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leverage at home, in a context that they perceive as ‘closed’ to their requests. Supranational dynamics 
are also relevant (14.9%), but transnational pressure applies only to 2.6% of casesxiv. 
 
<Table 1 here> 
 
However, a comparison across countries points to important differences in the forms of 
Europeanisation: Italy and Spain are characterised by externalisation (in 73.8% and 69% of cases 
respectively) – as it is more typical of ‘closed’ context (see also Keck & Sikking 1998). Austria, 
Germany and the UK show instead primarily forms of domestication (89%, 84% and 79.5% 
respectively), which could be linked to weakeness but also to a strategic choice within a political 
domestic context which is perceived as ‘open’ by civil society (for the Austrian case, see TTIP 
coalition document 15/07/2015). As fas as supranationalisation is concerned, with EU actors which 
target directly EU institutions, we see it particularly present in events in Spain and France (in 7-9% 
of cases), whereas forms of Europeanisation via transnational pressure are more frequent in France 
(5.5%) and the UK (6.9%). In sum, the role of the interplay between the domestic and European 
opportunities in shaping collective mobilisation is confirmed when looking at the different paths of 
Europeanisation: Externalisation, is mainly present in those countries (as IT and ES) where the 
national context is closed. On the contrary, in those countries where the ‘opportunities’ are more open 
and the national institutions are considered a more trustable ‘connection’ to Brussels (as in AT, the 
UK and DE), domestication is the preferred form of Europeanisation. 
 
Consensual or Conflictual Europeanisation?  
Beyond end of ‘permissive consensus’ towards Europe, more recently scholars talk about a 
“constraining dissensus” (Hooghe & Marks 2009: 39) referring to a politicisation of the process of 
integration increasingly critical. Therefore, another relevant dimension to investigate in terms of 
forms of Europeanisation of movements is the degree of conflict in the process of Europeanisation. 
That is, do anti TTIP social movements moderate their repertoire of action when they address the 
European level?  
According to our data, movement organisations tend to use mainly demonstrative (i.e.protest) actions 
(in about 50% of events) and, secondly, conventional actions (contacting/lobbying, 
consultation/cooperation, action toward courts, etc. in 20.9% of cases)xv. 12% of the events take the 
form of media-related actions, and 7% are online actions (such as publications of online articles, 
petitions, donations). 9% of the events are expressive actions aimed at activating citizens on the TTIP 
issue with cultural and symbolic events such “rising social awareness with conferencestalks, lectures, 
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training sessions, articles, radio and TV programs” (Spanish Stop-TTIP representative, Stop-TTIP 
Coalition document, 15/07/2015)xvi. Finally, only 1% of the events are confrontational actions. 
However, when looking at how the action stragies change at the EU level (namely either the protester 
or the event have an ‘European’ scope - Figure 3)xvii, we see that, as hypothesised, the EU decision 
making style seems to influence the repertoire: the TTIP social movement tends to use strategies 
traditionally considered as common to interest groups, namely lobbying instead of protest.  
 
 
<Figure 3 here> 
  
 
More specifically, on the one hand, conventional actions (i.e. lobbying) increase to one third (31.2%) 
when the mobilisation occurs at the EU level, becoming the most important form of actionxviii; on the 
other hand, demonstrative actions (i.e. protest) sharply decrease to 25%. Indeed, as underlined by the 
representatives of the Stop-TTIP movements in Germany, their main strategy is “taking to the streets 
- showing that it's not clicks, but real people behind big numbers” (Stop-TTIP Coalition document 
15/07/2015)xix. Differently from other research findings (e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009), media-
related actions are not very frequent at the EU level (6.5%), whereas online activities are (22%)xx. 
Surprisingly, confrontational actions are used more at the EU than at the national level (around 6% 
vs. 0.2% of cases), confirming that with ‘closed’ opportunities, mobilisation is more difficult, but 
when it occurs it is more radical (curvilinear relationship).  
These findings on the moderation of the action repertoire at the EU level may be better interpreted by 
turning to the qualitative data of our interviews. Indeed, several civil society organisations stress that 
they mainly use knowledge and spreading out of information (i.e. mobilise cognitive resources, in 
our terms) at the European level, whereas political resources (as citizens’ direct mobilisation) are 
used mainly at the national level (Int. 1, 3, 7, 10). In fact, the various anti TTIP actors interviewed 
are fully aware of the multilevel nature of the campaign, as explained for example by the 
representative of the EU level organisation ‘Transport & Environment’ who notes that her group was 
“responsible for the organisation of lobbying at the EU level, whereas the affiliated national 
organisations organise protest events and marches at the national or even subnational level on their 
own” (Int. 8). Similarly, also the BEUC representative explains that the type of work done in Brussels 
“is mainly lobbying, whereas other forms of action are left to national or local organisations” (Int. 6) 
and the ‘Friends of the Earth’ group not only stresses a division of labour between the national and 
the EU level, but also emphasises the more favourable context for protest at the domestic one: “at the 
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national level we leave the job to other members of the Stop TTIP coalition and to our national sister 
organisations [whose] work is more effective, due to mass support. In Brussels we focus more on the 
diffusion of information […] relationships with EP members” (Int. 9).  
 
Organisational Characteristics and Europeanisation  
Do SMOs and collective actors richer in resourses have greater access to the EU level? The hypothesis 
according to which Europeanisation is facilitated by the availability of organisational resources 
(material and symbolic) is here tested by comparing the mobilisation of different types of actors 
mobilising in the anti TTIP campaing. Beyond similar political opportunities, we see from our data 
that the Europeanisation of the different types of groups that compose the anti –TTIP movement 
varies. First of all (data not showed in figure, available upon authors request), with regard to the 
intensity of the mobilisation, the prominent actor is represented by the stop-TTIP coalition as a whole 
(mobilising in 46% of all cases). Political parties and environmentalist groups come second 
(accounting both for 10% of protest events). Trade Unions follow (5.7%), together with civil right 
movements, economic groups (e.g. farmers) and think tanks. More specifically (Figure 4), when 
looking at the development of European actors (namely at the scope of the actor who initiates the 
protest as European), political parties and movement organisations belonging to the previous Global 
Justice Movement (GJM) account for a large proportion (20-30%). We find very few Unions 
organised at the EU level, as well as think thanks and economic interest groups (8-9%), whereas 
environmental and consumerist movements, as well as the TTIP coalition as a ‘whole’, stay in a 
median position (with 13-15% of events by EU level actors belonging to these categories).  
 
 
<Figure 4 here> 
 
 
In terms of Europeanisation as level of mobilisation (i.e. EU scope of the event), similarly political 
parties and groups belonging to the GJM movement stand out (accounting both for about 25-27% of 
cases). They are followed by environmental organisations and by the Stop-TTIP coalition as a ‘whole’ 
(which initiates events with a ‘EU scope’ in 19% of cases). All the other actors, trade unions included, 
are well below these figures. Finally, when looking at events addressing EU targets: trade unions, 
together with the Stop-TTIP as a whole, as well as political parties, are prominent (having EU targets 
in 42-52% of their cases). They are followed by environmentalists and GJM groups (with respectively 
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27% and 37% of EU target events). Third, we find think tanks and other professional-economic 
categories (addressing EU institutions in 14-15% of cases).  
To conclude, our findgins show that: (a) not only – as expected – traditionally stronger organisations, 
like political parties, ‘Europeanise’, but also actors less endorsed with material resources (as the GJM) 
do, at least in terms of European targets; (b) if there are still some thresholds for weaker organisations 
to mobilise on European politics (as the modest results of SMOs on all three dimensions of 
Europeanisation demonstrate), relational resources matter for European mobilisation. In fact, when 
the movements mobilise as a coalition (‘TTIP coalition as a whole’), they perform ‘better’ in terms 
of Europeanisation (on all the indicators), evidently compensating for the lack of material 
resourcesxxi. This finding is reinforced by the data of Table 1 about the different paths of 
Europeanisation of the mobilisation, that shows that domestication is more significant for social 
movements (and interest groups) (in 67% of cases vs. 59%-45% of all other actors). However, when 
SMOs act as ‘coalition’ externalisation is more frequent (in 40% of cases vs. 20% for political parties, 
23% for interest groups and 12% for social movements acting alone)xxii. Also (c), our findings on the 
strong European activism of the JGM suggest the importance of the heritage of previous protest 
resources that, as noted by scholars, can be ‘eventful’ (Jasper et al. 2011), namely providing collective 
actors with identities, overlapping membership and networks useful for the action.  
Furthermore, social movements and NGOs, beyond the national coordination, have started to build 
transnational ties and coordinating bodies: our data (Figure 5) indicate that SMOs and NGOs share a 
tendency to coordinate their actions transnationally and to address (thanks to these networks) 
European institutionsxxiii. With reference to the total events (N=784), in 54.7% of them the actors 
mobilise on their own, in 32.4% with another national actor and in 12.9% in coordination with an 
actor from another country (i.e. crossnational) or international (e.g. an international federation). Most 
importantly, we see that the more supranationally ‘networked’, the more the anti TTIP social 
movements ‘Europeanise’, namely they are able to organise events with an EU scope or to address 
the European institutions.  
 
 
<Figure 5 here> 
 
 
In fact, from the interviews it emerges that a multilevel structure is present in several SMOs: 
“activating unexpected allies” is the strategy underlined by the representatives of the TTIP protest in 
Germany (TTIP Coalition document 15/07/2015); also, as explained by the French representative of 
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the Stop-TTIP campaign, “we have tried to work also at the EU level but we usually do it together 
with the other Stop TTIP campaign representatives” (Int. 2). Similarly the representative of the 
European coordination unit stresses that “[…] the bulk of the organisation has been done coordinating 
domestic effort” (Int. 3) and another European NGO representative states that their main activity 
during the Stop-TTIP campaing has been their involvement “in an institutional setting, the TTIP 
Advisory Body [a coordination body] which allowed us the express our concerns vis-à-vis EU 
institutions” (Int. 6)xxiv.  
Put more broadly, our data confirm that European campaings tend to consolidate European networks 
of activitists (della Porta et al. 2009). This relevant degree of transnational embeddedness might be 
related to the weak institutionalisation of supranational movement actors, which pushes national 
movement organisations to be directly involved in multilevel pressures. In sum, coordinating, either 
at the national and the European level, does matter for the Europeanisation of collective action.   
 
Conclusion  
European integration multiplies both restrictions and opportunities for social movements, serving as 
an impetus to increase their range of intervention in order to overcome the former and exploit the 
latter. However, the question remains: Is the EU (as well as other supranational institutions) 
accountable to pressures from below? In this study we have addressed this question, by looking at the 
Europeanisation of movements and NGOs mobilising against the TTIP. We can summarise our 
findings as follows. 
Firstly, our data show that the POS still matter and it documents a strong SMOs adaptation in terms 
of multilevel governance: The Stop-TTIP movement is playing a ‘double-level’ game (Putnam 1988) 
since EU institutions are a growing target, together with national governments. Compared to the 
mentioned previous studies on Europeanisation of political mobilisation, which found a certain 
general degree of Europeanisation (della Porta & Caiani 2009; Koopmans & Statham 2010; 
Seidendorf 2003) which were accompained by some caveats, our data indicate that, at least when 
looking at the protest campaign against TTIP, there is a significant degree of Europeanisation of social 
movement actors in terms of: i. intensity of mobilisation around a genuine European(ised) and even 
technical policy; ii. development of European actors (through the transnational networking of 
domestic organisations); iii. level of mobilisation and repertoire of action (fully adapted to multilevel 
governance). The Europeanisation of social movements is not a limited phenomenon (for similar 
recent findings see also, Balme and Chabanet 2008; Monforte 2014; Ruzza 2014; Uba and Uggla 
2011). 
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Secondly, we found that this process has specific characteristics. In our study we find differential 
Europeanisation, which can be better understood by taking into account the multilevel opportunity 
structure exploited by the movement. With this regard, our work adds another piece of empirical 
research to support the intuition of those social movement scholars aware of the importance of the 
national context, and the necessity to take into account the multilevel opportunity structure in the 
analysis of (Europeanised) social movements, which act as “rooted cosmopolitans” (Tarrow 2005). 
Indeed, in line with the POS hypothesis, the political opportunities of the TTIP policy-making at the 
EU level influence the Europeanisation of social movements (higher when the opportunities are 
perceived as open, lower when they are closed); however, there is a great variation across countries 
on this respect, which can only be explained by the interplay of the EU and national political 
opportunities together. Our data stress that social movements ‘Europeanise’ more (especially in terms 
of targets and level of the mobilisation) when the opportunities are ‘closed’ at the national level (i.e. 
Italy and Spain), whereas in the other countries (mostly Austria, Germany, but also France and United 
Kingdom) whith a more favourable context, the main targets and scope of the mobilisation are 
domestic. With this respect, the specific multilevel opportunities configuration influences also the 
paths of ‘Europeanisation’ of collective actors which tend to recur to externalisation when they do 
not have much leverage at home (as in the cases of closed political opportunities in Italy and Spain), 
whereas domestication is the most frequent path for movements facing a more open context of 
national opportunities (Austria, Germany, France and the United Kingdom). Also research in IR has 
pointed at the recent increase in the externalisation of protest toward international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs), as the main strategy of transnationalisation of civil society groups when states 
censor or repress them (see among others della Porta & Parks 2015). More empirical and comparative 
studies are needed -on different policy issues and types of movements- to further elaborate hypotheses 
on the link between the two (or more) levels. More specifically, while literature on political 
opportunity in the European Union properly is generally rare (della Porta & Parks 2015), our study is 
theoretically in line with those scholars stressing that adaptation to the EU level is crucial (della Porta 
et al. 2009; Lahusen 1999: 202), and it offers an empirical contribution to the research stressessing 
that a variable model of political opportunity structure is preferable in order to account for interacting 
opportunities at multiple levels (Bieler 2005; della Porta & Caiani 2007; Lahusen 2004; Sikkink 
2005).  
Thirdly, in line with our hypothesis according to which the decision making style influences the 
strategies of action (e.g. Marks & McAdam 1999; Tilly 1978), we find more lobbying than protest at 
the EU level also with respect social movementsxxv. In fact, as expected, we find that, overall, 
conventional actions are more frequent at the EU level, whereas demonstrative strategies are more 
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used at the national and local level. This finding would also, indirectly, support those who consider 
that professionalisation of the NGOs at the EU level has the potential to improve representativeness 
(Saurugger 2006). Also, it must be noted how online actions are becoming increasingly relevant in 
terms of repertoire of action at the EU level, as an effect presumably of the enlargement of citizens’ 
repertoire of political participation and of growing interest in transnational issues (della Porta et al. 
2009).  
Finally, in line with recent literature comparing the Europeanisation of different types of SMOs, in 
this article we argue that, beyond material, also relational resources play an important role in the 
transnationalisation of civil society organisations (see also Monforte 2014; Ruzza 2004). More 
specifically, we showed that not only economic resource-rich organisations (such as political parties 
or unions) are capable of targeting EU institutions and staging EU protests, but also social movement 
organisations, especially when they coordinate their actionxxvi. By exploiting networks, movements 
can increase their effectiveness in multilevel arenas through resource and knowledge exchange with 
other movements and IGOs (Rucht 2004). In this, our findings emphasise the role of cognitive 
resources (such as the building of new collective identities through framing, the mobilisation of 
expertise, etc., Geddes & Guiraudon 2004; Lahusen 2004; Monforte 2014) to access EU institutions. 
In sum, Europeanisation ‘from below’ is increasingly becoming a reality: The European public space 
is fully acknowledged as a relevant one, not substituting the national level but complementing it. 
From our research (as in ACTA, see Parks 2015), it seems that SMOs have definitively come of age 
in their multilevel capacities, and – if not adequately considered – they may possibly soon be an 
increasing challenge to EU institutions in other policy areas. 
 
References  
Balme, R. & Chabanet, D. (2002). Introduction. Action collective et gouvernance de l’Union 
Européenne. In R. Balme, D. Chabanet, & V. Wright (eds), L’action collective en Europe. 
Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. 
Balme, R. & Chabanet, D. (2008). European Governance and Democracy: Power and Protest in the 
EU. Lanham (Md.): Rowman & Littlefield. 
Beyers, J. (2002). Gaining and Seeking Access: The European Adaptation of Domestic Interest 
Associations. European Journal of Political Research 41(5): 585–612. 
Beyers, J. & Kerremans, B. (2011). Domestic Embeddedness and the Dynamics of Multilevel Venue 
Shopping in Four EU Member States. Governance 25(2):  263–290. 
21 
 
Bieler, A. (2005). European Integration and the Transnational Restructuring of Social Relations: The 
Emergence of Labour as a Regional Actor?. Journal of Common Market Studies 43(3): 461–
484. 
Bourne, A. & Chatzopoulou, S. (2015). Social movements and the construction of crisis actors: 
Collective responsibility, Identity and Governance. International Journal of Public 
Administration 38(12): 874–883. 
Bouza Garcia, L. & Del Rio Villar, S. (2012). The ECI as a Democratic Innovation. Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society 13(3): 312-324. 
Chabanet, D. (2002). Les marches européennes contre le chomage, la précarité et les exclusions. In 
R. Balme, D. Chabanet, & V. Wright (eds), L’action collective en Europe. Paris: Presses de 
Sciences Po. 
della Porta, D. & Caiani, M. (2007). Europeanisation from Below? Social Movements and Europe. 
Mobilization 12(1): 1-20. 
della Porta, D. & Caiani, M. (2009). Social Movements and Europeanisation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.   
della Porta, D. & Mattoni, A. (2014). Patterns of diffusion and the transnational dimension of protest 
in the movements of the crisis: An introduction. In della Porta, D. and Mattoni, A. (eds) 
Spreading protests: Social movements in times of crisis. Colchester: ECPR Press. 
della Porta, D. & Mosca, L. (2009). Searching the net: Web sites’ qualities in the global justice 
movement. Information, Communication & Society 12(6): 771-792. 
della Porta, D. & Parks, L. (2015). Europeanisation and social movements: before and after the great 
recession. In Börner, S. & M. Eigmüller (eds) European integration, processes of change and 
the national experience. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
della Porta, D. & Parks, L. (2016). Social movements, the European crisis, and EU political 
opportunities. Comparative European Politics 15(64): 1-18. 
della Porta, D. & Tarrow, S. (eds) (2005). Transnational Movements and Global Activism. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. & Rucht, D. (2009). Social Movements in a Globalizing World: An 
Introduction. In D. della Porta, H. Kriesi & D. Rucht (eds) Social Movements in a Globalizing 
World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y.N. (eds) (2011). The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research. London: 
Sage. 
Diani, M. & McAdam, D. (2003). Social movements and networks: Relational approaches to 
collective action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
22 
 
Dierckx, S. (2015). European unions and the repoliticization of transnational capital: labor's stance 
regarding the FTT, The TTIP, and the CETA. Labor History, 56(3): 327-344. 
European Commission (2015). Media use in the European Union. Standard Eurobarometer 84.  
European Commission (2016). The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)- Stay of 
Play.  
Geddes, A. & Guiraudon, V. (2004). The emergence of a European Union policy paradigm amidst 
contrasting national models: Britain, France and EU anti-discrimination policy, West 
European Politics 27(2): 334–353. 
Giugni, M. & Passy, F. (2002). Le champ politique de l’immigration en Europe: Opportunités, 
mobilisations et héritage de l’Etat national. In R. Balme, D. Chabanet, & V. Wright (eds), 
L’action collective en Europe. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. 
Greenwood, J. (2007). Interest Representation in the European Union. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Greenwood, J. (2012). The European Citizens’ Initiative and EU Civil Society Organisations. 
Perspectives on European Politics & Society 13 (3): 325-336. 
Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science 39(1): 
1-23. 
Imig, D. & S. Tarrow (eds) (2001). Contentious Europeans. Protest and Politics in an Emerging 
Polity. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.  
Imig, D. & Tarrow S. (2000). Political contention in a Europeanising polity. West European Politics 
23(4): 73-93. 
Imig, D. (2004). Contestation in the Streets: European Protest and the Emerging Euro-politics. In G. 
Marks & M.R. Steenbergen (eds), European Integration and Political Conflict. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Jasper, J. & Goodwin, J. (eds) (2011). Contention in Context: Political opportunities and the 
emergence of protest. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Keck, M. E. & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Kitschelt, H. P. (1986). Political opportunity structure and political protest: Antinuclear movements 
in four democracies. British Journal of Political Science 1: 57-85. 
Koopmans, R.; Statham, P; Giugni, M. & Passy, F. (2005). Contested Citizenship: Immigration and 
Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Koopmans, R. & Rucht, D. (2002). Protest event analysis. In B. Klandermans & S. Staggenborg (eds), 
Methods of Social Movement Research. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. 
23 
 
Koopmans, R. & Statham, P. (2010). The Making of a Public Sphere. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kousis, M. (2014). The Transnational Dimension of the Greek Protest Campaign Against Troika 
Memoranda and Austerity Policies, 2010-2012. In della Porta, D. and Mattoni, A. (eds), 
Spreading protests: Social movements in times of crisis. Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Kriesi, H. (2004). Political Context and Opportunity. In D.H. Snow, S.A. Soule & H. Kriesi (eds), 
The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Ladrech, R. (1994). Europeanisation of domestic politics and institutions: The case of France. JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 32(1): 69-88. 
Lahusen, C. (1999). International campaigns in context: collective action between the local and the 
global. In Social Movements in a Globalizing World. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lahusen, C. (2004). Joining the Cocktail Circuit: Social Movement Organisations at the European 
Union. Mobilization 9(1): 55-71. 
Larsson, B. (2014). Transnational trade union action in Europe – the significance of national and 
sectoral industrial relations. European Societies 16(3): 378–400. 
Leiren, M.R. & Parks, L. (2014). When trade unions succeed: Cases of blocked liberalisation in the 
common market. European Journal of Political Research 53(3): 465-479. 
Marks, G. & McAdam, D. (1996). Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political 
Opportunity in the European Union. West European Politics 19(2): 249-278.  
Marks, G. & McAdam, D. (1999). On the Relationship of Political Opportunities to the Form of 
Collective Action: the Case of the European Union. In D. della Porta, H. Kriesi & D. Rucht 
(eds), Social Movements in a Globalizing World. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Mathers, A. (2016). Struggling for a Social Europe. Neoliberal Globalization and the Birth of a 
European Social Movement. Abingdon-New York: Routledge.  
Mazey, S. & Richardson, J. J. (2002). Pluralisme ouvert ou restreint? Les groupes d'intérêt l'Union 
Européenne. In Balme R., Chabanet, D. & V. Wright, L'action collective en Europe. Paris: 
Presses de Sciences Po. 
McCarthy, J. & Zald, M.N. (eds) (1996). Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political 
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framing. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Meyer, D.S. (2004). Protest and Political Opportunities. Annual Review of Sociology 30: 125-145.  
Monforte, P. (2014). The Cognitive Dimension of Social Movements' Europeanisation Processes. 
The Case of the Protests against ‘Fortress Europe’. Perspectives on European Politics and 
Society 15(1): 120-137. 
24 
 
Morin, J.F., Novotna, T., Ponjaert, F. & Telò, M. (eds.) (2015). The Politics of Transatlantic Trade 
Negotiations: TTIP in a Globalized World. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Mueller, C. (1997). Media Measurement Models of Protest Event Data. Mobilization 2(2): 165–84. 
Parks, L. (2015). In the Corridors and in the Streets. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Poloni-Staudinger, L. M. (2008). The domestic opportunity structure and supranational activity: An 
explanation of environmental group activity at the European Union level. European Union 
Politics 9(4): 531-558. 
Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International 
Organisation 42(3): 427-460. 
Radaelli, C. M. & Franchino F. (2004). Analysing Political Change in Italy. Journal of European 
Public Policy 11(6): 941–53. 
Risse, T., Green Cowles, M. & Caporaso, J. (2001). Europeanisation and Domestic Change: 
Introduction. In Green Cowles, M., Caporaso, J. & T. Risse (eds) Transforming Europe. 
Europeanisation and Domestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1–20. 
Rodekamp, M. (2013). Their Members’ Voice: Civil Society Organisations in the European Union. 
Wiesbaden: Springer. 
Rootes, C. (2002). The Europeanisation of Environmentalism. In R. Balme, D. Chabanet, & V. 
Wright (eds), L’action collective en Europe. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. 
Rucht, D. (2002). The EU as a Target of Political Mobilisation: Is There a Europeanisation of 
Conflict? In R. Balme, D. Chabanet, & V. Wright (eds), L’action collective en Europe. Paris: 
Presses de Sciences Po. 
Rucht, D. (2004). Movement allies, adversaries, and third parties. In D.H. Snow, S.A. Soule & H. 
Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Ruzza, C. (2004). Environmental Sustainability and Policy Networks in Tourist Locations. Foedus 
11. 
Ruzza, C. (2014). Civil Society Actors and EU Fundamental Rights Policy: Opportunities and 
Challenges. Human Right Review 15: 65-81. 
Saurugger, S. (2006). The Professionalisation of interest representation: A problem for the 
participation of civil society in EU governance. In S. Smismans (ed.), European Governance 
and Civil Society. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.   
Seidendorf, S. (2003). Europeanisation of national identity discourses. Comparing French and 
German Printed Media. Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research 
meeting. 
25 
 
Sikkink, K. (2005). Patterns of Multilevel Governance. In D. Della Porta & S. Tarrow (eds) 
Transnational Protest and Global Activism. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Tarrow, S. (1989). Democracy and disorder. Protest and politics in Italy, 1965-1975. Oxford: 
Claredon Press.  
Tarrow, S. (1994). Social Movements in Europe: Movement Society or Europeanisation of Conflict? 
Florence: European University Institute. 
Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Tarrow, S. (2005). The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tilly, C. (1978). From Mobilisation to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Uba, K. & Uggla, F. (2011). Protest Actions against the European Union, 1992–2007, West European 
Politics 34 (2): 384-393. 
i The European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) is a EU procedure, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, aimed at enabling 
the "EU citizens to participate directly in the development of EU policies" (see  http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/welcome). It enables 1 million citizens of the EU, who are nationals of at least 1/4 of the member states, 
to call directly on the EC to propose a legal act. 
ii The notion of ‘scope of the actor’ initiating the protest and of the ‘target’ toward the protest is directed refers to the 
organisational extension of the organisation and/or institution. E.g. a protest against the EU Commission has a ‘European 
scope of the target’. The notion of the ‘scope of the event/action’ refers instead to the scope of the mobilisation – namely, 
to the geographical and/or political scope of the substantive mobilisation of the event. For further details about our 
measurements, see the following sections. 
iii Only for ‘Europeanised’ protests, namely protests with EU actors, events and targets. 
iv Among the various operationalisations of political opportunities (for a detailed literature review of the concept, see 
Meyer 2004), in this study we look at the dimensions of the context illustrated in Appendix A, which combines both 
institutional features and discursive factors of the ‘TTIP’ POS and COS/DOS, both at the EU and national level.  
v However, some criticise this perspective showing that not all social movements involved on the EU level politics have 
been transformed into fragmented field of individual interest groups and lobbies (e.g. Lahusen 2004). 
vi One (left wing oriented) per country (since it has been showed by the literature on PEA that doubling the newspapers 
do not increase significantly the number of events found, Koopmans & Rucht 2002): La Repubblica for Italy, El Pais for 
Spain, and analogous ones, according to Lexis Nexis availability. However mainstream newspapers did not provide us 
with many protest events (see next endnote).  
vii This mix of sources allowed us 1) to bypass the media blackout on the TTIP issue present in some of the mainstream 
media in our six countries, and 2) to balance the possible biases introduced by using (also) the news sections of the SMOs 
and NGOs websites. In addition, redundant articles have been eliminated and intercoders’ reliability tests and online 
discussions of difficult cases have been done.   
viii The number of protest events passed from 5 in Italy at the beginning of 2014 to 16 in 2016, with a peak of 54 events 
in the first semester of 2015; from 5 to 9 in UK in the same period, with a peack of 44 events in the second semester of 
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2015; from 8 to 13 in AT with a peak of 72 events in the first semester of 2015 and from 20 to 27 in DE with a peak of 
50 events in the first semester of 2015. In Spain the overall amount of events remained stable from 5 in 2014 to 6 in 2016, 
with a peak of events in the central years of our analysis. The same holds true for events organised at the EU level (10 in 
2014 and 2016 respectively, with a peak of 22-25 events in the central years).  
ix As mentioned the ‘scope’ of the actor organising the protest event and the scope of the addressee refer to the 
organisational extension of the organisation and/or institution (e.g. Italian Government, European Commission, etc.). In 
our coding scheme the categories for the scope of the actor/target vary from ‘local’ (city/district or regional) to 
‘crossnational/multilateral' (which refers to 'involving actors from two or more countries'), to supranational, i.e. 
‘European’. The notion of the ‘scope’ of the mobilisation refers to the geographical and/or political scope of the 
substantive mobilisation of the event. For instance, if an article mentions an anti TTIP event organised in Bruxelles or 
simultaneously in more than one of our selected European countries, the scope of this protest event is ‘European’. 
x E.g. the German Trade Union Federation as well as the ‘Chambres of commerce’ joined the anti-TTIP coalition from 
the very beginning (Stop-TTIP document 15/07/2015). 
xi For example, the German Parliament established a ‘petition committee’ on TTIP.  
xii For the typology and related analyses, we considered, relying on Imig and Tarrow’s 2001 criteria, all events related to 
the anti TTIP mobilisation since they by default involve claims ‘launched in response to the EU policies and institutions’. 
To obtain the four types of Europeanisation, we crossed the scope of the protester (national vs. European) and the scope 
of the target (national vs. European). In order to measure the level ‘Europeanisation’ of each of these dimensions we 
added the variable ‘scope’, ranging from local, to national, crossnational, and European/supranational (for ‘measurement’ 
details see the endnotes in section 4). Only the categories sovranational/EU have been considered measuring 
‘Europeanised’ actors, events and targets.   
xiii An example of domesticatication is the lobbying done by anti TTIP movements in Spain on the political parties with 
the aim of introduce the TTIP issue in their program or the case of the German coalition "TTIP unfairhandelbar" which 
submitted a petition to the German Parliament with over 68,000 signatures (14/10/2014; source: our PEA data). 
xiv An example of ‘transnational pressure’ is the case of the event called ‘Municipalities against TTIP’ that was celebrated 
in Madrid with the participation of European local government representatives and political parties (30/06/2015; source: 
our PEA data).  
xv In order to classify the repertoires of action, we distinguished six main social movement action strategies (Tarrow 
1989): Conventional actions associated with conventional politics and the institutional arena (e.g. related to electoral 
campaigns). Media related actions (e.g. organising press conferences, distributing releases or pay for advertisements, 
giving interviews/letters to newspapers, etc.); Demonstrative actions, which are legal actions aimed at mobilising large 
numbers of people (e.g. street demonstrations – legal and nonviolent – rallies, petitions, etc.); Expressive actions, i.e. 
initiatives whose aim is more to unite the militants rather than to display the movement’s strength; Confrontational 
actions, which are also nonviolent, but aimed at disrupting official policies or institutions, and therefore usually illegal 
(e.g. blockades, occupations, etc.) and on line actions (e.g. mail bombing, etc.). 
xvi Examples of expressive actions are the case of the Trojan horse brought by the TTIP protestors around many European 
cities or the ‘Transatlantic Resistance Journey Against TTIP’ organised by the European Greens in June 2015 in Madrid 
(source: PEA data).  
xvii The Cramer V beetween scope of the actor (Nat. vs. EU) and type of action is 0.27***; beetween scope of the event 
(Nat vs. EU) and type of action=0.40***. For a matter of space constraints, Figure 3 shows only data obtainted selecting 
as basis of the analysis ‘EU scope events’. However, the same trends (data available upon request) emerge also when we 
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select events with ‘European actors’ as the basis for the analysis: conventional actions are 20% at the national vs. 26% at 
the EU level; and demonstrative actions (i.e. protest) are 54% at the national vs. 14% at the EU level.   
xviii To be noted that this change of repertoire of action holds true both for countries characterised by a more consensual 
‘movimentistic’ tradition, such as DE and UK, and for those with a more ‘protest culture’. Cramer V beetween event 
scope and type of action, disaggregated per country =0.22** (for event scope national), 0.26** (for event scope EU).   
xix For example, on April 18, 2015, more than 50 Spanish cities participated in the Global Day of action against TTIP 
(source: our PEA data). Similarly, during an election campaign event of the SPD in Hamburg, 120 German citizens 
organised a flashmob against TTIP and CETA (ibid.). 
xx As examples of online actions at the EU level we can mention the case of the Stop-TTIP UK movement that before the 
2014 EU elections emailed 150 European candidates to ask for their position on TTIP (19/03/2016, PEA). 
xxi To this we can add that not only ‘relational resources’ matter, but also they seem to interact with the POS of a country: 
in those countries where the POS is more closed (as in Italy or partly in France), this is compensated with the high 
coordination capacity of civil society actors and to address the European level (disaggregated data, not showed). 
xxii Focusing on events made by political parties, supranationalisation is the dominant form of Europeanisation 
(representing about 25% of cases). 
xxiii To measure the level of “transnational embeddedness,” we coded if the event was organised only by one actor or in 
coordination with another actor, either national or organisations abroad as well as international organisations. The 
indicators compare the percentage of protests with EU targets and EU events organised by single vs. ‘networked’ actors.  
xxiv We can observe a higher degree of transnational embeddedness among Spanish and German social movement actors 
and a lower level for the Italian and french, with the English and Austrian ones in beetween (Cramer V 0.49***). 
Transnational contacts do not seem typical of the most institutionalised and resourceful movement traditions, but are all 
the most relevant for the more contentious Southern movements. 
xxv Although when the few protest emerges at the EU level, it is disruptive, according, as expected, to a curvilinear 
relationship between (closed) context and radicalness of collective action.  
xxvi Although the focus of this study on the Europeanisation of social movements is mainly on the POS approach, for 
further research purposes the history of the SMOs at the national level (that goes beyond the scope of this article) should 
be considered. In fact, the SMOs composing the anti TTIP coalition display different experiences of protest, of 
networking, and they mobilise in contexts in which this issue has different levels of salience (see section 6). All these 
dimensions play a role in the process of Europeanisation of social movements, in particular with respect to relational 
resources.  
 
